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AVERY DENNISON CORP. V. SUMPTON
189 F.3d 868 (9 h Cir. 1999)
INTRODUCTION
Appellant-Defendants, Jerry Sumpton and Freeview Listings
Ltd., appealed an injunction granted by the United States District
Court for the Central District of California in favor of plaintiff-
appellee, Avery Dennison Corp. ("Avery"), after summary
judgment for Avery on its claims of trademark dilution under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act' and the California dilution
statute The case marked the third major decision issued by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applying trademark law to the
Internet since late 1998.' The court held that Avery failed to create
a genuine issue of fact on its dilution actions and reversed and
remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to enter
summary judgment for appellants.'
FACTS
Jerry Sumpton is the president of Freeview, an Internet e-mail
provider doing business as "Mailbank," which offers "vanity" e-
mail addresses to users for a fee.6 Sumpton registered thousands of
domain-name combinations and made available catalogs of e-mail
addresses, including an archive of common surnames followed by
1 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
2 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330 (West 1987)
3 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
4 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1999). The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals previously had decided Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th
Cir. 1999), and Panavision Int'l, L.P., v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998).
5 Avery, 189 F.3d at 874.
6 Id.
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the top-level domain.net' Mailbank's surname archive included
the domain-name combinations avery.net and dennison.net'
Avery sells office products under the trademark "Avery,"
which has been in continuous use since the 1930s and registered
since 1963, and industrial fasteners under the trademark
"Dennison," which has been in continuous use since the late 1800s
and registered since 1908.' Avery spends more than $5 million
advertising all of its trademarks, including the "Avery" and
"Dennison" marks, and realizes approximately $3 billion in
product sales each year."0 Avery maintains registrations for several
domain-name combinations, all using the top-level domain .com,
including avery.com and averydennison.com n
Avery sued Sumpton and Freeview, alleging trademark dilution,
and Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), alleging contributory dilution
and contributory infringement."l The district judge granted
summary judgment to NSI and against Avery.1 3 As to Sumpton, the
district judge found that the disputed trademarks were famous as a
matter of law and granted summary judgment to Avery on its
dilution claim and entered an injunction requiring Sumpton to
transfer the registrations avery.net and dennison.net to Avery.4
Sumpton filed a timely appeal.
7 Avery, 189 F.3d at 872. Avery also offered addresses which represented
hobbies, careers, pets, sports interests, as well as categories such as "rude" and
"business" which included some common trademark addresses with the top-
level domain .com. Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. The evidence did not indicate what percentage of advertising costs and
sales revenues were attributable to the "Avery" and "Dennison" marks
individually.
11 Id.
12.Avery, 189 F.3d at 873.
13 Id.
14Id.
222 [Vol. X:221
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Burden Of ProofAnd Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a district court's grant of a permanent
injunction is de novo.' To determine the legality of the injunction,
the court considered de novo the underlying grant of summary
judgment to Avery and denial of summary judgment to Sumpton. 6
"Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."' 7
Enacted in 1995, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act is a fairly
recent development at the federal level reflecting many long-
recognized state causes of action for trademark dilution.
Traditionally, federal law provided protection only against
infringement of a registered trademark and unfair competition.'
Unlike infringement and unfair competition laws, competition
between the parties and a likelihood of confusion are irrelevant in
the dilution context. 9 Pursuant to the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act, the court analyzed the case under the statute's enumerated
factors. 20 First, the court considered whether Avery's marks were
famous. Second, the court considered whether Sumpton made
commercial use of Avery's marks. Third, the court considered
whether defendant's use presented a likelihood of dilution of the
distinctive value of Avery's marks. Similarly, under California
law, the court considered whether Avery could demonstrate a
likelihood of dilution of the distinctive quality of its marks,
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties
and lack of confusion as to the source of the goods."
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Avery, 189 F.3d at 874.
18 Avery, 189 F.3d at 873.
19 Id.
20 Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
21 Id. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330.
1999]
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B. Famousness
The first consideration for the court was determining whether the
"Avery" and "Dennison" marks were famous. Dilution is a cause
of action meant to protect a small, exclusive class of trademarks
that possess, "such powerful consumer associations that even non-
competing uses can impinge on their value." '22 Quite unlike
infringement and unfair competition, plaintiff in a dilution action
must demonstrate more than the mere inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of its trademark. The trademark must be "truly
prominent and renowned." '23 From a policy standpoint, such careful
selection by courts of which trademarks are eligible for dilution
protection minimizes undue impact on other uses.24 This notion
was confirmed by the Trademark Review Commission of the
United States Trademark Association which stated, "we believe
that a limited category of trademarks, those which are truly famous
and registered, are deserving of national protection from
dilution." 25
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act lists eight non-exclusive
considerations to determine whether a trademark is famous:
(1) the degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the mark;
(2) the duration and extent of use of the mark in
connection with the goods or services with
which the mark is used;
(3) the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the mark;
(4) the geographical extent of the trading in
which the mark is used;
(5) the channels of trade for the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
22 Id.
23 Avery, 189 F.3d at 875.
24 Id.
25 Id.
224 [Vol. X:221
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(6) the degree of recognition of the mark in the
trading areas and channels of trade used by the
mark's owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(7) the nature and extent of use of the same or
similar marks by third parties; and
(8) whether the mark was registered ... on the
principal register.26
The court acknowledged "an overlap" between the above
statutory factors and those considerations used establish a
trademark's acquired distinctiveness.27 The court, however,
employed a higher standard to determine the famousness of the
"Avery" and "Dennison" marks. In order for the "Avery" and
"Dennison" trademarks to be diluted, the court asked whether the
marks had "a degree of distinctiveness and strength beyond that
needed to serve as a trademark."2 To answer this inquiry, the
court analyzed three statutory factors: distinctiveness, overlapping
channels of trade and use of the marks by third parties.
1. Distinctiveness
The court first considered the inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of Avery's marks. Both "Avery" and "Dennison"
are surnames. Under the Lanham Act, marks that are surnames
may not be protected unless they acquire secondary meanings
thereby making them distinctive.29 The drafters of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act added similar protections for surnames.0
26 Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
27 Avery, 189 F.3d at 876. Those factors include (1) whether actual
purchasers associate the mark with plaintiff; (2) the degree and manner of
plaintiff's advertising; (3) the length and manner of plaintiffs use of tble mark;
and (4) whether plaintiff's use of the mark has been exclusive.
28 Avery, 189 F.3d at 876.
29 Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4), (f) (1994).
30 Avery, 189 F.3d at 877. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated "The
committee intended to give special protection to an individual's ability to use his
or her own name in good faith." Id.
1999]
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Thus, the court concluded the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
required that Avery satisfy, at a minimum, the secondary-meaning
requirement for registration of surnames.31
The court found that Avery's registration of both "Avery" and
"Dennison" provided prima facie evidence that the marks have
achieved a secondary meaning.3" Consequently, the court rejected
appellant's argument that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
required inherent, rather than merely acquired distinctiveness.33
However, under the increased standard applied by the court, mere
distinctiveness was not sufficient. More than distinctiveness, the
court required Avery to demonstrate its marks also were famous.34
Since Avery could not demonstrate more than mere distinctiveness,
the court held Avery failed to meet this consideration of the
famousness analysis.3
2. Overlapping Channels Of Trade
The court next examined the fifth and sixth factors of the
famousness inquiry: Avery's channels of trade and the marks'
degree of recognition in those channels shared by Avery and
Sumpton. The court did not require Avery's marks to be nationally
famous, but only that they achieved fame in a localized trading
area and market segment shared by Sumpton.36 Here, appellants'
customer base was Internet users seeking vanity e-mail addresses
while Avery marketed its products to purchasers of office products
and industrial fasteners.37 The court found no indication in the
record that "Avery" or "Dennison" were recognized amongst
Internet users nor that appellants marketed their e-mail services to
31 Id.
32 Id..
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Avery, 189 F.3d at 877.
37 Id.
[Vol. X:221226
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Avery's customer base. 38  Therefore, the court held these
considerations supported appellants.39
3. Use Of "Avery'" and "Dennison " By Third Parties
The court next considered the nature and extent of use of
Avery's trademarks by third parties." The court found that third
parties commonly used "Avery" and "Dennison", both on and off
the Internet." According to the court, "when a mark is in
widespread use, it may not be famous for the goods or services of
one business."'42 Consequently, the court found it unlikely either
mark could be considered a famous mark eligible for dilution
protection.43
4. Other Relevant Factors
Finally, the court evaluated the remaining statutory factors. The
court found Avery had used the trademarks for many years, spent
substantial money advertising the marks and marketed "Avery"
and "Dennison" products internationally.' While those factors
supported Avery, the court held they did not establish the
trademarks as famous.4"
In support of its argument, Avery submitted three market
research studies that evaluated public perceptions of the "Avery"
and "Avery Dennison" brands. The court however, characterized
the studies as "flawed" since the survey groups included
consumers already familiar with Avery products or users or
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Avery, 189 F.3d at 878.
41 Id. The record included both a list of businesses with "Avery" in their
names which market products on the internet and a list of business names
including "Avery," which represented a sample of over 800 such businesses.
Similarly, identical types of lists were provided for "Dennison," which
represented a sample of 200 such businesses. Id.
42 Id..
43 Id.
44Avery, 189 F.3d at 878-79.
45 Avery, 189 F.3d at 879.
1999] 227
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purchasers of office products.46 The court found the reports shed
no light upon the key inquiry, whether consumers in general have
any brand association with Avery's trademarks.47
C. Commercial Use
The court next analyzed whether Sumpton's registration of
avery.net and dennison.net constituted commercial use. Under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, the defendant must use the
trademark as a trademark, "capitalizing on its trademark status."'
The court found Sumpton neither intended to usurp the value of the
marks as marks nor sold the trademarks themselves.49 Rather,
Sumpton used avery.net and dennison.net for their non-trademark
value, as popular surnames for vanity e-mail accounts.5" Thus, the
court held Sumpton did not use avery and dennison as trademarks
as required by the caselaw addressing commercial use and
mandated summary judgment in favor of Sumpton."
D. Dilution or Likelihood Of Dilution
Finally, the court considered whether Sumpton's use of avery.net
and dennison.net caused dilution or a likelihood of dilution under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and California Business and
Professional Code § 14330. Avery asserted two theories of
dilution. First, Avery argued Sumpton's conduct constituted
cybersquatting dilution.5" Second, Avery argued Sumpton tarnished
the "Avery" and "Dennison" marks by offering them alongside
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Avery, 189 F.3d at 880.
49 Id.
50 Id.
5lId.
52 Avery, 189 F.3d at 880. Cybersquatting dilution previously was
recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Panavision, 141 F.2d at
1326-27.
228 Vol. X:221
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lewd second-level domain names.53 The court examined each in
turn.
1. Cybersquatting
The court first considered whether Sumpton's use of avery.net
and dennison.net constituted cybersquatting dilution.
Cybersquatting dilution is "the diminishment of the capacity of
plaintiff's marks to identify and distinguish plaintiffs goods and
services on the internet."'54 Dilution occurs because plaintiffs
prospective customers may refuse to search for plaintiffs website
after a failed attempt under the mistaken belief that plaintiffs
website does not exist.'5 In this case, however, the court
distinguished between the .net registrations of avery and dennison
and the more common commercial first-level domain designation
.com. As .net applies to networks and .com. applies to commercial
entities, the court concluded a factfinder could infer that dilution
did not occur because Sumpton registered the marks under
avery.net and dennison.net rather than avery.com and
dennison.com.56 Therefore, the court held that those genuine issues
of fact precluded summary judgment in favor of Avery.57
2. Tarnishment
The court next considered whether Sumpton's use of the
"Avery" and "Dennison" marks constituted tarnishment.
Tarnishment occurs, "when a defendant's use of a mark similar to a
plaintiffs presents a danger that consumers will form unfavorable
associations with the mark. 8 Avery argued that housing avery.net
and dennison.net with lewd domain-name registrations created a
53 Id.
54 Avery, 189 F.3d at 880. For example, a potential customer may assume
that trademark.com corresponds to the company website which owns trademark
and sometimes may be misled. Id.
55 Id.
56 Avery, 189 F.3d at 881.
57 Id.
58 Avery, 189 F.3d at 881.
1999] 229
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danger of tarnishing Avery's marks.5 9 However, the court also
noted that moving between avery.net or dennison.net and lewd
domain-name registrations required a user to link through
Sumpton's homepage, thereby reducing the association between
the Sumpton's lewd registrations and Avery's marks.' Regardless,
the argument was moot as the court held the danger of tarnishment
could not be decided on summary judgment and did not support
the district court's ruling.61
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals reversed the district courts ruling that
Avery's trademarks were famous, constituted commercial use and
caused dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and
parallel California Business and Professional Code § 14330.62 As
Avery failed to meet its burden under the either statute, the court
remanded the case to the district court with instructions for entry of
summary judgment for the appellants.
Erik Kantz
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Avery, 189 F.3d at 881-82.
63 Id.
230 Vol. X:221
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